General Hospital and educational programs like the Theological Schools' Committee on Clinical Training, Myers tracks the formal routes of this pastoral work and its predominance among liberal Protestants. By 1965 the American Association of Pastoral Counselors (AAPC) formed, signaling the abundant course offerings and degree programs available to produce professional counselors with theological investments. Yet in the same year that the AAPC was inaugurated, Fuller Theological Seminary established a School of Psychology, a follow-up to the 1950s organization of the Christian Association for Psychological Studies. As liberal Protestants started to look more secular than liberal to some critics, evangelicals reacted with organizational fervor, working to create a counseling subculture that emphasized biblical moral standards and God's necessary presence in any transformation of the self. Since she focuses on liberal religious figures, Myers-Shirk misses an opportunity to underline this important moment of Christian schism and rebuttal. Nevertheless, through her lucid descriptions and sensitivity to her subject matter, she offers a significant historical description of contemporary therapeutic presumption.

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Ursula Prutsch. *Creating Good Neighbors? Die Kultur- und Wirtschaftspolitik der USA in Lateinamerika, 1940–1946*. (Transatlantische Historische Studien, number 33. Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts, Washington, DC.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2008. Pp. 476. €56.00.

During the past fifteen years historians have re-examined the field of inter-American relations and, engaging with the cultural turn, have increasingly paid attention to the "soft" factors in these relations. Ursula Prutsch's book is a welcome addition to the field and a veritable tour de force. A plethora of U.S. initiatives—involving not only the government, but also civil society—were created to tighten relations with Latin America under the Good Neighbor Policy during the 1940s. The United States wished to win the hearts and minds of Latin Americans as it faced the Nazi threat; furthermore, economic and military motives, such as gaining access to and increasing the production of raw materials as well as creating markets for U.S. products, also shaped policy. For her study Prutsch focuses on the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), led by business magnate Nelson A. Rockefeller, which she considers "the missing link" in analyses of the Good Neighbor Policy.

Prutsch approaches her subject in three parts. She first details the workings of the OIAA in general, discussing its relations with the State Department and its complex entanglements with other wartime agencies as well as professional and academic organizations. The author pays close attention to the OIAA's ties with the business world and emphasizes its role in garnering crucial economic information, including that involving the affairs of people on the controversial blacklists of "axis supporters." Prutsch then lays out the organization's activities in the field of press relations, details film campaigns (including, but not limited to, the works of Disney), and examines radio politics and other attempts to reach the masses in Latin America.

The next two sections of the book explore the OIAA's activities in Brazil and Argentina more closely, and it is here that Prutsch's contribution is particularly strong; drawing on considerable secondary sources and several archives in these countries, she brings their cultural spheres to life. Prutsch details covertly financed lecture tours and serves up a wealth of information on radio and film propaganda. Some of these subjects have been examined before (Carmen Miranda, for instance, or the Brazil Builds traveling exhibition), but others have so far remained obscure in this multiverse of initiatives. Prutsch also does an excellent job of giving the reader a sense of the people involved in these projects through concise biographies that make clear the extent to which the academy, business, and philanthropy were tightly interwoven and the ways in which a person could move through these institutions rather quickly. The few pages on Maria Rosa Oliver, an Argentine OIAA collaborator, take us from the 1930s to the 1950s and also chronicle her disenchantment with U.S. policy.

The OIAA seems to have been—out of necessity at a time of war—more self-reflective and at times critical of its own efforts than one would expect, so that even sections that rely mostly on OIAA material give a sense of the limits and problems involved in "creating good neighbors," abounding in examples of mutual misunderstandings and the patronizing attitudes of the Americans. But given Rockefeller's strong sense of his own importance as well as that of "his" agency, it is perhaps not surprising that Prutsch also tends to overstate the OIAA's role at times. While she acknowledges the other agencies active in inter-American relations, some of them long before the OIAA (most notably the Pan-American Union and the Cultural Affairs Division of the State Department), the relations are not always clear. The programs relating to mass media seem to have been developed squarely within the OIAA, but the relationship of the OIAA to other initiatives like the Brazilian-American Food Production Commission is much less evident. Of course, the nearly impossible task of teasing out the tangle of overlapping wartime agencies is a historian's nightmare, which manifests itself in the text in frequent expressions like "under the aegis of the OIAA and other institutions" (p. 290).

Prutsch's assessment of the OIAA efforts is mixed. The alliance with the business sector gave U.S. policy a better reach, but especially in the field of mass media it led to the perpetuation of stereotypes that both sides had hoped to reduce. Even though American policies were much less successful in Argentina than in Brazil, they still led to much accumulation of knowledge on both sides and the creation of networks of professionals and intellectuals that remained beyond the dissolution of the OIAA. Moreover, Prutsch shows nicely that Bra-

zil in particular was able to use U.S. resources for the affirmation of its own cultural identity. As for the economic policies the OIAA supported, the author correctly remarks that the "development paradigm" (p. 195) was already in operation during the war, but can we really ascribe its rise solely to the OIAA? Such issues of interpretation notwithstanding, Prutsch has produced an outstanding book, a great resource for any student of inter-American relations and one that should be translated to gain a greater audience in Latin America and the United States.

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Michael Grow. *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2008. Pp. xiv, 266. $34.95.

In undertaking the research for this monograph, Michael Grow set out to explore the economic and national security concerns that led the United States to intervene repeatedly in Latin America during the Cold War. After reviewing the evidence, however, he concluded that the traditional framework had to be jettisoned in favor of one that emphasized the role of Latin American actors, U.S. domestic politics, and, above all, U.S. credibility. Through eight tightly argued case studies (Guatemala, Cuba, British Guiana, Dominican Republic, Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama), Grow refutes both the realist and revisionist schools of interpretation, which have insisted that anticommunism and U.S. corporate interests lay at the root of U.S. interventionism in Latin America during the Cold War. Instead, he argues, scholars need to grapple with why so many U.S. presidents felt trapped into launching military interventions to save their domestic reputations and to prove to the world, as the elder George Bush once put it, that "what we say goes."

Grow is careful to explain at the outset that he does not intend to describe U.S. military interventions in Latin America, or to explore the aftermath of those interventions, or even Latin American reactions to them. The focus on high-level U.S. decision making undoubtedly facilitated the inclusion of so many cases studies, the details of which might have otherwise overwhelmed the reader. Although this study is not based on archival research, the author does demonstrate strong familiarity with the historical literature surrounding each intervention, and he clearly has a knack for employing colorful quotations to prove his points. Henry Kissinger, we learn, "never gave a shit about the business community" (p. 100); and President Lyndon Johnson wondered, "What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?" (p. 89).

Studies of this kind are designed to be provocative, and Grow's will certainly invite criticism. One problem is that the historical record for U.S. interventions occurring after the Nixon presidency is incomplete due to long delays in the declassification process. It also seems curious that the author did not try to link U.S. motivations to the chosen instrument of intervention. If the purpose of intervening in Latin America was to demonstrate American credibility to the world, then why did Washington rely on covert action so often (five out of eight interventions)? At times, Grow seems to overstate his case. The insistence that Latin American actors played a "pivotal" role in fomenting interventions overlooks the fact that coup plotters red-baited their enemies so frequently that many U.S. analysts learned to discount their opinions. The contention that domestic political considerations "virtually forced Kennedy to pursue an interventionist policy" in Cuba (p. 53) appears exaggerated, as does the claim that reports from one of Richard Nixon's close personal friends were the "decisive" reason behind his decision to intervene in Chile (p. 194).

Given Grow's willingness to transcend traditional categories of analysis, it is surprising that he failed to incorporate race and gender into his explanation for U.S. interventions in Latin America. Scholars such as Frank Costigliola have emphasized the importance of language in the study of U.S. foreign relations, and Grow's subject matter would appear to invite such an application. This omission reflects a more general failure to situate the analysis in the context of U.S. hegemony and empire. After all, the issue of credibility begs the question: if military interventions were meant to signal to foreign governments that the United States would not tolerate challenges to its interests, then what were those interests, and why should they not count in an assessment of U.S. motivations for intervention? The self-imposed confines of Grow's study do not permit an exploration of the meaning of intervention that takes into account the kinds of regimes that Washington installed after it deposed a government. For example, is it a mere coincidence that U.S. investment soared in Guatemala after the Eisenhower administration deposed Jacobo Arbenz? Was it merely an oddity of history that Chile became the laboratory for neoliberalism after Augusto Pinochet deposed Salvador Allende with Washington's blessings? Grow insists, with good reason, that individual U.S. economic interests did not control American foreign policy. But he fails to consider that, ever since the Open Door policy of 1899, the U.S. State Department has been preconditioned to evaluate regimes on their willingness to accommodate free trade and foreign investment, or what the historian Emily Rosenberg has called "liberal developmentalism."

Perhaps it is to Grow's credit that he did not try to grapple with these complexities or try to provide some sort of grand model with hierarchical explanations. His greatest contribution has been to help scholars reconsider the role of credibility in elite decision making, thereby rising to the challenge raised nearly two decades ago by Robert McMahon in his Stuart L. Bernath